The inauguration date of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump is approaching, and with that comes talk of the conditions and guarantees needed for a ceasefire between the two Slavic countries, each with its own demands and vision for achieving it.
February 24 of this year will mark three years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Despite Moscow’s efforts to portray the outcome of its folly as a victory, the so-called “SMO” (special military operation) proved to be far from a walk in the park for Russian troops.
According to the most conservative estimates of Western intelligence agencies, including recent statements by Donald Trump, Russia’s personnel losses amount to at least 600,000 people. Hundreds and thousands of units of military equipment have been turned into scrap metal, and the Russian military-industrial complex can hardly cope with the resulting deficit.
Speaking of the economic aspect, there is hardly a single argument in favor of the victory narrative. In the first months of “SMO”, up to a million qualified and educated citizens left Russia, and the ongoing influx of Central Asians points to a serious personnel shortage in the country, caused primarily by the enormous losses at the front.
Allocation of a third of the annual budget to military needs has led to holes in other sectors of the economy and social services. Every month in Russia there are at least 6 thousand communal accidents, inflation by the end of 2024 was almost 10%, and housing and utility tariffs will increase by 12% this year.
Both Russia’s foreign trade and foreign policy, are likewise experiencing a crisis. Under sanctions pressure, Russia has lost its premium gas and oil markets, ceding them to OPEC countries and the United States. About 300 billion dollars in foreign exchange reserves remain frozen in Western banks, with the prospect of using them as reparations for Ukraine.
This has resulted in Moscow being forced to sell energy resources to India and China at unprecedentedly low prices. And in the case of the latter, it even approved deforestation in Siberia and the Far East, transferring more than a million hectares of Russian land to Chinese companies on a long-term lease, in contrast to slightly more than 67 thousand square meters of Ukrainian land seized since 2014.
It is also worth remembering that Putin’s pretext for “SMO” was to prevent NATO from expanding eastward, but even here things went wrong. On the contrary, NATO’s border with Russia doubled in almost three years with the addition of Finland in 2023 and later Sweden in 2024.
From a reputational standpoint, Vladimir Putin continues to top the list of losers among world leaders. His political short-sightedness have prompted other, once allied states, in particular from the CSTO, to think twice about the prospects for rapprochement with Moscow. And the failure of the Russian campaign in Syria has completely undermined confidence in the Russian leader.
It is fair to note that the Kremlin’s notorious “red lines”, as it turns out, also tend to expand infinitely, as the past months of war have shown. The delivery of F16s to Ukrainian forces, as well as the White House’s permission to fire long-range ATACMS missiles deep into Russian territory, have not led to any escalation.
Thus, President Putin, who was re-elected last year, and his loyal propaganda mouthpieces, are clearly facing a dilemma as to which angle and in what perspective to present the results of the “SMO” to the Russian people as a victory. Yet, without fully occupying the Donbas, such a possibility will be entirely out of reach.
But even here, much work remains to be done. Despite the apparent success of the past year, advancing through every meter of the Donbas land and occupying every new village there is costing Russia unthinkable resources, as they are going up against Ukrainian forces that are firmly and effectively defending themselves.
We also cannot but mention the counter-offensive of Ukraine’s armed forces in Kursk region, with the seizure of more than 100 settlements already on the territory of the aggressor itself. To this day, Russia has been unable to drive the Ukrainians out of there, and was even forced to turn to the DPRK for help, but, as it turned out, even such a desperate measure falls short of the expected result.
Summarizing all the facts and arguments we can draw a very simple conclusion. Although both sides of the military conflict are trying to come out of the situation victorious, neither of them is likely to fully succeed. After all, both Russia and Ukraine are on the brink of their military and economic capacity.
The signing of the ceasefire document will largely depend on the decision of President-elect Donald Trump and the position of Chinese colleagues on this issue. Fortunately, both sides understand the immediate need to put an end to the already prolonged bloodshed in Eastern Europe. Ukraine needs guarantees of the inviolability of its borders from Russia in the future, and Russia needs at least some arguments for its citizens that “SMO” was not in vain.
Whatever points and compromises we see in this document at the time of its signing, it is very likely that Russia will face a difficult period of restructuring and turbulence. Selling the people a piece of Ukrainian land destroyed to the foundations as a victory, after all the sacrifices and efforts, is not an easy task.
Besides, the US is not interested in an unconditional victory for Russia. After all, in that case, it would inspire other authoritarian countries and radical groups to change state borders by force, which would mean new wars and more bloodshed.
Ukraine, on the contrary, withstood the onslaught of Russian troops, which prevailed in terms of strength and resources, and did not lose its independence and sovereignty, although not without the help of its Western allies. Therefore, in the global context, it won, not on the scale that had been planned, but still.