The shadow fleet transporting Russian oil has experienced significant growth, representing around 17% of the global oil tanker fleet by the end of 2024. The trajectory of this phenomenon remains unpredictable, driven by its rapid expansion and the volatility of the geopolitical and economic landscape.
This growing situation is a cause for concern among legitimate maritime carriers, as the number of vessels in the shadow tanker fleet — mainly transporting oil and oil products from Iran, Venezuela, and Russia — is steadily increasing in global waters. These vessels are used to bypass Western sanctions, facilitated by shell companies and dangerous, covert oil transshipment operations. Almost 70% of Russian oil exports are now transported by these shadow tankers, and this number has increased significantly since the beginning of the war in Ukraine.
More than 1,000 shadow vessels are operated in the interests of Russia. This fleet mainly consists of obsolete tankers in poor working conditions, most of them not having proper insurance provided by leading global companies. They are mainly owned by offshore companies with opaque ownership rights. Therefore, in case of an accident, it remains unclear who will be bearing the responsibility.
Security is compromised due to the poorly regulated activities of the shadow fleet. It is common practice for shadow tankers to disable their transponders (ship positioning systems), a violation of International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations that endangers other vessels. The lack of vessel tracking information jeopardizes the integrity of the global maritime security system.
Moreover, recent incidents in the Baltic Sea indicate that the Russian shadow fleet is not only used to transport oil but is also involved in damaging European energy and communications infrastructure. The most recent example is the interception and detention of the tanker Eagle S by Finnish Special Forces. This incident clearly indicates that Russia and its partners are aiming to use the shadow fleet for sabotage.
On December 6, 2023, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted an important resolution aimed at addressing the problems associated with the shadow fleet. The document was a response to concerns about illegal shipping, which is associated with bypassing sanctions and carrying out dangerous operations. It calls on IMO member states to forbid registering fraudulent ships, and to strengthen inspections of tankers in ports. However, this does not work in practice.
Leading marine operators and shipping management companies predict that the IMO’s lack of control over the situation and the uncontrolled growth of vessels in shadow fleets will inevitably lead to serious oil spill accidents, which will have catastrophic consequences for the environment. In addition to environmental damage, certified and legally operating companies will also suffer due to the closure of contaminated areas for shipping.
In addition to the IMO problems, it is worth noting the lack of attention paid to this issue by EU member states, Norway and Iceland. This benefits dishonest businessmen, and allows authoritarian regimes in Iran, Venezuela and Russia to bypass international sanctions and make big profits.
The international sanctions imposed on individual vessels of the shadow fleet and regulatory measures have a limited effectiveness. It is vital to strengthen sanctions against states and entities violating international law, and to counteract fraudulent schemes — international efforts must be collective, consistent and persistent.
Moreover, The EU and UK must tighten the rules on the use of obsolete tankers to prevent their use in the shadow fleet. Additionally, the ban on suspicious vessels entering ports must be effectively enforced.
Experts in maritime law and sanctions have long highlighted Denmark’s ability to fully control ship passage through the straits between the North and Baltic Seas. Similarly, the British and French maritime authorities could have control over the English Channel. Maritime security agencies and specialized bodies of European maritime States have sufficient powers to carry out inspections of suspicious vessels, their detention and arrest.
Additionally, modern technologies allow qualified monitoring of the marine area using specialized UAVs and satellite surveillance to identify the activities of the shadow fleet, and to record illegal ship-to-ship transfers (STS). It is very important that Operation Nordic Warden, launched by Great Britain, becomes effective and serves as an example for other European maritime states to follow.
It would be entirely reasonable for the IMO to implement additional shipping security measures to ensure that the hidden owners, operators, and crews of vessels under the flags of «convenient” countries are fully aware that violations will not go unnoticed or unpunished. The organization could be effective in strengthening regulations for the inspection of ships carrying out ship-to-ship (STS) transshipments, especially if this occurs outside exclusive economic zones, without observing the established reporting procedures.
The growing size and sophistication of shadow fleet activity pose ongoing challenges that require coordinated international efforts. The IMO cannot achieve this breakthrough on its own. Unfortunately, it lacks the ability to directly enforce regulations that already do not cover the full range of fraudulent methods used by shadow fleets.
In this context, it is highly expected that the participants of the «Shadow Fleet: A Call to Action» initiative (18 July 2024) will truly adhere to the principles and commitments they have signed. It is crucial that the declaration does not suffer the same fate as the Budapest Memorandum and other international agreements.