Disinformation via Telegram. Latest challenges for international community

The Telegram messenger has become a key tool for spreading pro-Kremlin disinformation and propaganda in the international arena. In 2024 alone, around 800 pro-Kremlin channels were identified, operating in more than 30 languages. These channels replace official Russian media outlets like RT and Sputnik after the latter were restricted in the US, EU, and other countries after Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

These channels act as key vehicles for spreading Kremlin-backed disinformation aimed at undermining trust in Western governments and international organizations, as well as reducing support for Ukraine from the European Union, NATO allies, and other partner nations. They actively circulate propaganda content justifying Russia’s military aggression in Donbas and promote various conspiracy theories serving the Kremlin’s interests. These pieces are aimed at forming and strengthening a positive perception of Russian government’s actions both domestically and internationally. Tailored articles justify the annexation of Crimea and support military operations in eastern Ukraine, portrayed as an effort to “protect the Russian-speaking population” from mythical threats posed by Kyiv. Such narratives also include attempts to discredit Western nations and their allies, portraying their actions as aggressive and anti-Russian.

The combined audience of these channels reaches 15.7 million, with publications getting nearly 100 million times per day. Such significant engagement allows these channels to effectively spread disinformation and manipulate public opinion around the world. They target audiences in Europe, the Americas, Asia, and Africa. The diversity of languages ​​in which these channels operate allows for achieving maximum reach and effectively influence global public opinion. It should be recalled that in the run-up to the Paris 2024 Games, pro-Kremlin Telegram channels have been stepping up their outreach in France, spreading disinformation aimed at creating discontent among the French citizens, attempting to sow distrust in the government, and fueling concerns about the security of the Games. Examples of such disinformation include false claims of the allegedly weak preparation for event security and attempts to discredit French politicians advocating support for Ukraine. In response to these threats, the French authorities have decided to restrict access to the Olympics for Russian journalists, technical staff, and other specialists. A number of Russian journalists suspected of close ties to Russian intelligence and of participating in psyops aimed at undermining stability in France were denied visas.

Using Telegram as a platform, Russia seeks to influence public opinions in targeted nations, especially among the youths. Channels often focus on topics that will likely resonate with certain public concerns, such as migration, in order to fuel conflicts and undermine trust in democratic institutions. This poses a particular threat to countries where high levels of social and political tension are observed. For example, the topic of migrants is actively exploited to create a false impression of chaos and failures of Western governments. Not only does it contribute to the rise of xenophobia and racism, it also undermines unity within the EU and other countries, which, in turn, plays into Moscow’s hands.

For more than a week, mass riots and protests against migrants have been raging across the UK, including in London, Bristol, Belfast, Southport, Hull, Liverpool, Manchester, and Stoke-on-Trent. The unrest was provoked, among other things, by a false report initially published on a Russia-linked website. British authorities have expressed deep concern about possible Russian interference through disinformation campaigns that could contribute to the incitement of public tension and street violence. These developments raise questions of whether the UK, as well as other countries, are prepared to deal with massive unrest provoked by the Kremlin. Questions of how such actions might affect domestic stability and how will governments respond to potential threats are becoming relevant not only for the UK, but for other countries as well.

If the international community is set to protect itself from Russian interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and maintain stability, resolute measures are needed to combat disinformation spread via Russian websites, social networks, and Telegram channels. This may include restricting access to such platforms, more actively monitoring and blocking them, as well as developing national and international strategies to counter attacks in the media domain. Joint efforts by governments and international organizations to strengthen cybersecurity and counter propaganda will help protect democratic processes and maintain stability.